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Recent Developments
United States v. Watts

I

n an unsigned opinion, the
United States Supreme
Court affirmed in United States v.
Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997)(per
curiam), that federal judges may
use convicted defendants' related
but acquitted conduct in deciding
their sentences, provided that the
conduct is established by a preponderance of the evidence. In so
holding, the Court eliminated a
discrepancy between the Ninth
Circuit and the other federal
circuits when it found neither a
federal statutory nor a constitutional bar against consideration of
this type of conduct. As a result,
judges may evaluate any related
acquitted charges of the defendant
in determining sentences.
The Government combined
two similar cases, United States v.
Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995),
and United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d
1386 (9th Cir. 1996), in its petition
for writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court. In the first
case, Vernon Watts was charged
with possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute and use of a
deadly weapon in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime. At trial, he
was convicted on the drug charge
but acquitted on the gun charge.
Upon sentencing, the United States
District Court for the Eastern
District of California found the
gun charge related to the drug
charge by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Accordingly, it increased Watts's sentence by two
points pursuant to the United
States Sentencing Guideline
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Manual. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit set aside the sentence, holding that the district
court erroneously connected the
gun charge with the higher
sentence.
In the second case, Chery I
Putra was charged with two counts
of aiding and abetting possession
with intent to distribute cocaine.
Putra was convicted on one count
at trial. The United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii
found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Putra's involvement
in the second charge warranted an
upward departure under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines
Manual, resulting in a stronger
punishment.
On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the
sentence, holding that the district
court should not have considered
the acquitted charge, since the
combined charge would punish
Putra for acquitted conduct. The
petition for writ of certiorari
followed.
Beginning its analysis, the
Court examined federal statutory

law enacted prior to the Sentencing
Guidelines. It stated that a court
has enormous discretion to
examine all relevant factors in the
sentencing process. Watts, 117 S.
Ct. at 635 (discussing 18 U.S.C. §
3661). The Court reinforced its
opmIOn by pomtmg to a
substantial body of case law
holding that prior conduct
"'[h]ighly relevant - if not essential - to the [the judge's] selection of an appropriate sentence is
the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics. ", Id. (quoting Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247
(1949)). The Court also criticized
the departure of the court of
appeals from "'well established'"
precedent. /d. (quoting United
States v. Done/son, 695 F.2d 583,
590 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
The Court next turned its
attention toward evaluating the
meaning and intent of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines
Manual and Commission. Id The
Court explained that provisions in
the Guidelines closely mimic
federal statutory law in that they
also afford broad discretion to
sentencing courts to "consider,
without limitation, any information
concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant." [d. at 635-36 (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 1B1.4). Specifically, the Court
noted that the Guidelines directly
pennit courts to weigh all relevant
conduct flowing from the facts and
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 89
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circumstances of the convicted
charge, "whether or not it resulted
in a conviction." Id. at 635-36
U.S.
SENTENCING
(citing
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ IB1.3,
IB1.3(a)(2), cmt., background.).
Finally, the Court determined that
Congress intended the Guidelines
to "at a minimum . . . provide
additional
penalties
when
defendants are convicted of multiple offenses." Id. at 636 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 994(1)).
In reversing the court of
appeals, the Court rejected the
argument that heightened sentences penalize defendants for acquitted conduct. Id. at 636. The
Court instead pointed to case law
holding that increased sentences
punish criminals for "the manner
in which [they] committed the
crime of conviction." Id. (citing
Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct.
2199, 2207-08 (1995)). In addition, the Court rejected the
argument that a verdict of not
guilty denotes the "rejection" of a
set of facts by the jury which
precludes the facts from use by the
sentencing court. Id. at 63 7 (citing
United States v. Brady, 928 F .2d
844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991),
abrogated on other grounds,
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738 (1994)). In distinguishing the
terms "acquittal" and "innocent,"
the Court explained that a verdict
of not guilty means only that the
Government's evidence failed to
meet proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, a finding of not
guilty does not mean that the jury
rejected the given set of facts. Id.
(citing United States v. One

27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 90

Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354, 361 (1984)). In sum, the
Court concluded that a sentencing
court may properly use a defendant's acquitted conduct to
elevate the defendant's respective
sentence, so long as the conduct is
proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
In his concurring opinion,
Justice Breyer conceded that the
law permits judges to consider
related charges of which the
defendant was acquitted when
sentencing a convicted defendant.
Id. at 638. Nevertheless, he added
that the Sentencing Commission
holds the power to pass a provision
eliminating this information from
being considered by sentencing
judges. Id. at 638-39. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia refuted Justice Breyer's
position, maintaining that the
power to prohibit consideration of
this acquitted conduct rests solely
with Congress. Id. at 638.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice
Stevens noted that the purpose of
18 U.S.C. § 3661, enacted before
the Guidelines, was to allow the
judge to consider relevant conduct
of the defendant only in areas
where a judge had discretion to
rule. Id. at 639. He maintained
that, since the imposition of the
Guidelines, judicial discretion has
been substantially eliminated. Id.
Moreover, the statute fails to
clarify the relative weight to be
afforded this evidence. Id. In Part
II of his dissent, Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for their
failure to conduct oral argument on
the issues given the seriousness of

increased deprivation of citizens'
liberty. Id. at 641. In Part III, he
dismissed the case law relied upon
by the majority as unpersuasive,
since these cases: (1) did not
directly address the issue of burden
of proof in sentencing cases; (2)
were factually distinguishable; and
(3) were narrow in their application. Id. at 642-43. For these
reasons, Justice Stevens concluded
that judges should only be permitted to consider those charges
that have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt in deciding sentences for convicted defendants.
Id. at 643-44.
In a separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Kennedy briefly
conceded that the opinion of the
ninth circuit could have been
reversed solely because it ignored
the existing legal precedent of
every other circuit. Id. at 644.
Next, he criticized the majority for
their refusal to distinguish uncharged conduct from acquitted
related conduct. Id. He also noted
that the concurring opinions and
Justice Stevens's dissent amplify
the notion that the role of the
Sentencing Commission is unclear.
Id. Thus, Justice Kennedy maintained that the majority should
have heard oral argument on this
case and their failure to do so
precluded him from joining them
in their decision. Id.
In United States v. Watts, the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the federal judiciary
possesses enormous discretion to
consider all relevant conduct in the
sentencing process. So long as
there exists the requisite proof by
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preponderance of the evidence,
federal judges are free to consider
any and all conduct arising out of
a common scheme of criminality
for which the defendant has been
convicted. No longer maya defen-

dant be shielded by an acquittal on
a separate but related charge. This
decision may reflect the Court's
response to public pressure to curb
crime and punish criminals. Thus,
provided there is a judicial finding

of a preponderance of the evidence, judges may in effect disregard an acquittal and use the
charges as a vehicle to lengthen
defendants' sentences.

27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 91
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